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A B S T R A C T
This paper explores the legalization of mass illegal and informal construction (IIC) in Serbia (with particular
reference to the city of Belgrade). It analyzes the credibility of the socialist and post-socialist institutional fra-
meworks on IIC predicated upon the “credibility thesis” – an evolutionary understanding of institutions and their
path-dependent development. In the empirical analysis, the measures of state policies were interpreted, assessed,
and summarized in accordance with the Credibility Scales and Intervention (CSI) checklist. During the 1960s, a
restrictive urban policy and the impossibility of the socialist model to provide affordable residential space due to
fast urbanization, IIC consequently became an alternative method for meeting housing needs. In the 1990s, the
socialist development model was transformed into one that was post-socialist. A new wave of IIC ensued due to
the privatization of land-use and tenancy rights, and its vast scale has been a key driver for accommodating flows
of immigrants after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During this period, the Serbian
State stimulated policies that are more credible to facilitate, formalize, and condone IIC. It is concluded that IIC
in Serbia cannot be fully averted while legalization policies have, to date, been unsuccessful and non-credible.
1. Introduction
Since the 1950s and especially during the post-socialist period, one
of the greatest urban development issues in Serbia has been widespread
spontaneous and unplanned construction. According to the official data
of MBTIS (2017), the number of illegally constructed buildings (ICBs) in
Serbia is 2.05 million1 or 44% of the total number of structures. Lit-
erature has studied the “illegal” and “informal” in terms of their dual
nature: illegality, semi-illegality, and semi-legality of urban develop-
ment. There are stark differences as well as overlap between these
terms.
Despite the globally used concept of “informal”, however, there is no
global agreement on the terms “informal” and “illegal”. De Biase and
Losco (2017) suggest that informal has a positive connotation while il-
legal is generally more negative. UNECE (2017) indicated that “the
question of illegality is often put aside” and that “illegality is the key
issue in accessing security of tenure in informal settlements in the
countries of the Western Balkans”. The understanding of illegal con-
struction in Serbia encompasses a wide range of construction activities
“contrary to or forbidden by law, especially criminal law” (Oxford
English Dictionary, 2017); an activity or thing “contrary to or in vio-
lation of a law”, “not according to or authorized by law”, or “not al-
lowed by the laws or rules” (The Merriam-Webster, 2019).
The term illegal expresses a violation of law by the person who
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builds without a legal permit2 or, as the introduction to the special issue
ascertains:
“[W]e can define an activity or matter as illegal when it contravenes law,
lacks statutory sanctioning, or when it is explicitly prohibited” (Ho, this
issue).
The term “illegally constructed building” (ICB) is defined by the
Planning and Construction Act (2009, 2018), the Law on Legalization
(2013, 2015), and the Law on the Legalization of Buildings (2018)
based on the principle of the unity of Serbia's legal system. A significant
number of the ICBs occurs through speculative investment, especially in
the construction of large multi-family housing as well as commercial
and office buildings.3 Those who invest in buildings without a building
permit in order to sell them on the “black” market are actually involved
in illegal activity that is often linked to money laundering and tax
evasion. Investments in illegal real estate began during the wars in the
1990s so even luxurious structures in the most prestigious residential
areas were built illegally (Grubovic, 2006; Milić, Petovar, & Čolić,
2004).
From our understanding, the term informal can be regarded as an
introduced euphemism that is significantly different from the relevance
of illegal construction in Serbia.4 Contrary to illegal construction, in-
formal construction is the least opposed to the desired conduct or
standards that the state has sanctioned or prohibited. In this context, we
might invoke the following observation:
“Institutional forms that are illegal, but considered credible by govern-
ments, are more likely to be called informal” (Kolocek cited in Ho,
Introduction of this issue).
Informal construction involves satisfying existential human needs in
terms of an inadequate institutional framework for which a rule does
not jeopardize public interest and the property rights of others. In ac-
cordance with the legal definition of the informal “marked by the ab-
sence of required forms or procedures or by the relaxation of prescribed
rules” (Merriam - Webster, 2017). The “informal” is defined differently
in international documents (UN Habitat, 2007; UN Habitat, 2015;
Vienna Declaration, 20045; International Guidelines on Urban and
Territorial Planning, 2015; UNECE, 2017).
Due to the distinctions in the global understanding of the concept of
“informal construction” and the concept of ICB and “illegal construc-
tion”, which are regulated by Serbian law, we opted to use both terms.
Illegal construction is not part of the formal law, and it also does not
belong with the “informal” concept. In this paper, it is integrated into
the sublimated conceptual framework of “illegal and informal con-
struction” (IIC). In our interpretation, the phenomenon of IIC can be
understood as a type of juxtaposition. Due to the specificity of mass
spontaneous construction in Serbia (the co-existence and vagueness of
the concepts of informal and illegal), our study addresses two key
terms: “illegal and informal construction” (IIC) and “illegally con-
structed building” (ICB).
Over the course of the last century, there has been a shift in thinking
in neoclassical and heterodox economics related to the significance of
informal institutions, especially tenure security and the legal status of
property rights. There has been a move away from the conventional
neoclassical approach that supports titling and the security of property
rights. In the neoliberal discourse, it is important to establish strict
property rights, titling, and institutions that encourage “good govern-
ance”.
The proponents of such policies indicate that titling improves eco-
nomic development, contrarily, for instance, Bromley (2009) indicates
that the formalization of ownership relationships through land registration
presents a part of the political guidelines that are imposed on less ad-
vantaged countries. The formalization of property rights has become one
way to promote economic growth in underdeveloped areas especially by
applying the principles of the Washington Consensus that supports pri-
vatization and the strengthening of private property. Unlike mainstream
(neoclassical) economics, which appreciates “rationality, individualism,
and the balance of relationships”, heterodox economics is directed towards
institutions, social ties and structure (Davis, 2006), and tradition (Lawson,
2005) together with a trans-disciplinary approach.
In a new theoretical (heterodox economic) approach, there is a
deliberate focus on utilizing opposite principles and elements. At the
core of such a reading of institutional development lies the concept of
“credibility” that is related to the credibility thesis (Ho, 2014) and the
evolutionary approach of institutions as well as their path-dependent
development (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2000; Hodgson, 2006, 2009).
Referring to Hodgson (2006), institutions may be regarded as systems
of established and embedded social rules that structure social interac-
tions. He indicated the distinctions between “formal” and “informal”
institutions and that “formal institutions... always depend on non-legal
rules and inexplicit norms in order to operate”. Helmke and Levitsky
(2003) define informal institutions as common social rules that are
usually unwritten, designed, and enforced through official channels.
Lang (2012) points to the equality between formal rules and informal
practices, the power of individuals, and local specificities.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the underlying causes of mass IIC;
the influence of the socialist and post-socialist institutional frameworks
on IIC; the limitations and options of different legalization policies; and
the implied risks, consequences, and credibility of IIC in Serbia. It is
comprised of several parts: 1) the adopted theoretical framework and
methodology for analyzing and explaining IIC; 2) the causes, cred-
ibility, and dynamics of IIC; and 3) the effects of the legalization policy
during the socialist and post-socialist periods in Serbia with a number of
recommendations for solutions that are more credible.
2. Theoretical framework and methods
The study of the phenomenon of IIC as an informal institution in
Serbia is based on a contextually sensitive approach and the analysis of
institutional credibility by applying the new concept of the “credibility
thesis” including the concept of the evolutionary nature of institutions
and their path-dependent development (as compatible theoretical ap-
proaches). The credibility thesis belongs to a heterodox economic the-
oretical framework for understanding the context of the development of
social institutions and social rules. It ascertains that institutions result
from planned, intentional institution building but often materialize in a
significantly modified form than what was originally intended. The
credibility thesis is formulated in opposition to the neoclassical ap-
proach and posits contrasting postulates (Ho, 2016; Ho, 2017a):
1) institutional changes result from endogenous growth, spontaneity,
and self-organization;
2 De Biase and Losco (2017) have defined the illegal construction as “parti-
cularistic social regulation” with two types of illegal building: the necessary
illegal building and speculative illegal building. The necessary illegal building
refers to the need to provide housing because of serious individual economic
difficulties while speculative illegal building includes investments in objects to
make a profit and launder money.
3 Part of the illegal construction was performed even for public institutions
during the 1990s (e.g., the construction of buildings for public administration,
infrastructure, social welfare, schools, kindergartens, health care, churches,
etc.).
4 E.g., Grubovic (2006:21) indicates that informal construction in Serbia is
different from informal construction worldwide - “In Serbia, illegal housing
developed in a different context - economic, political and institutional…illegal
building in the post-communist period was led by the elite, and the existing
middle class”.
5 A document related to South-East Europe, which defines informal settlements
as “human settlements, which for a variety of reasons do not meet the re-
quirements for legal recognition (and have been constructed without respecting
formal procedures of legal ownership, transfer of ownership, and construction
and urban planning regulations)”.
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2) dynamic disequilibrium in institutional changes (continuous
changes); and.
3) institutional function supersedes to institutional form.
According to the theory, the credibility of institutions is not de-
termined by their “form” but by their spatially and temporally defined
“functions” (Ho, 2014). The concept of the credibility thesis contests
the basic neoliberal assumption that clear, transparent, formal property
rights are a necessary precondition for development. Ho (2017b) has
ascertained through the case of China that it is possible to achieve re-
markable economic and urban development despite uncertain property
rights, i.e., with insecure and ambiguous rules of ownership and
without institutional reforms. He contends that institutional change is
“never a simple matter of oppressed versus oppressors, winners versus
losers, or governors versus governed, but that all are intricately tied
into the same endogenous game” (Ho, 2017b: xvii). According to the
credibility thesis, institutions evolve from a spontaneous order that goes
beyond the intentions and powers of individual actors. Institutional
evolution is essentially of a conflicting nature, and institutions emerge
as a catalyst for economic, socio-political, and cultural functions.
The credibility thesis implies that credible (functional) institutions
survive in a certain space or time; otherwise, they would change or
disappear (Ho, 2016). The survival of institutions implies the changing
of their form or their disappearance, which is particularly important in
the design of a new institutional configuration. Additionally, credible
institutions cannot be exogenously designed because credibility in-
cludes endogenous and non-deliberate interaction between actors
concentrated on one goal.
Dynamic imbalance or disequilibrium is a continuous process, the
accumulation of change, and constitutes the essence of credibility. Ho
(2014, 2016) indicates that the credibility thesis could be applied to
institutions in two steps: first, by assessing the credibility level and,
secondly, by examining policy options based on the existing credibility.
Assessment of the institutional credibility level includes the establish-
ment of credibility proxies by indicators. Moreover, Ho (2014) states
that the indicators of institutional credibility include: the existence of
conflicts; the actors' perceptions of institutions or their benefits from
property rights, starting from the credibility of property rights within
the FAT (Formal, Actual and Targeted) framework; and the relative
speed of institutional changes.
According to Ho (2014, 2016), the stakeholders' perceptions about
the institutions involve using the FAT framework that contains formally
established rights, actual property rights in practice, and targeted
property rights. He has indicated that the policy options based on the
current institutional credibility imply the implementation of Credibility
Scales and Intervention, otherwise known as the CSI checklist (Ho,
2017b: 245), which we have also adopted for our analysis of IIC in
Serbia. It includes ordaining, prohibiting, facilitating, co-opting, and
condoning and implies different levels of credibility in relation to in-
stitutional arrangements.
The issue of informal institutional credibility (Ho, 2014) was in-
itiated due to the frequent failures of neoliberal structural adjustment
policies in developing countries. In this context, Grabel (2000) pointed
out that the failure of institutional reforms is not conditioned by the
insufficient commitment of some actors but by the absence of en-
dogenous credibility. She notes that the state has a major role in the
establishment of credible institutions by using “shock therapy” or the
gradual approach.
Neoliberalists widely believe that the success of economic policy
depends on a credible commitment to the free market, trade liberal-
ization, privatization of state enterprises and resources, and the legal
security of property rights.6 Grabel (2000) criticized these
interpretations of credibility, noting that the criteria of credibility are
used for the privileged neoliberal economic policies and institutions.
She believes that the criteria of credibility in theoretical terms are anti-
pluralist, i.e., credibility is always provided endogenously and not
exogenously by political and economic powers.7 Grabel also contends
that, if the credibility is conceptualized as a function of an endogenous
institution, then it becomes deprived of neoliberal postulates. That is
why neoclassical theorists deny the importance of endogenous factors.
Chang (2002) points to the interaction as a “constitutive” role of in-
stitutions, emphasizing the internal process of their shaping. Grabel
(2000) and Chang (2007) suggest the need to change the focus from the
institutional form to the institutional function, indicating that it is more
important to focus on what the institutions are doing (function) rather
than to focus on their appearance (form).
The credibility thesis is compatible with the widely accepted con-
cept of the evolutionary nature of institutions and their path-dependent
development (Dollimore & Hodgson, 2014; Hodgson, 2006, 2008;
Liebowitz & Margolis, 1999). Veblen (1994) introduced the evolu-
tionary approach to institutional economics in the late 19th century. He
believed that economics should be transformed into an evolutionist
doctrine that is focused on institutional evolution (Hodgson, 2008). The
evolutionary approach to economic theory is widely diversified, parti-
cularly in relationship to the operational principles and structural re-
lations, and it was intensively developed in the 1980s, although in the
absence of a common conceptual framework.
3. A discussion of IIC in Serbia: causes, credibility, and dynamics
The empirical research of the co-evolution of formal construction
and IIC provides an explanation of the primary causes of IIC in the
urban development of Serbia in the socialist and post-socialist contexts.
The significant of the three key elements of the credibility thesis related
to IIC in the Serbia's urban development process is preliminarily esti-
mated in both periods. The credibility thesis explains why interven-
tions, procedures, and patterns aim to rectify the abuse or deficit of
property rights. Research involves the analysis of institutional changes,
formal and informal causality, and the credibility of IIC in different
historical contexts.
The main causes of IIC during the socialist and post-socialist periods
in Serbia have generally been identified as follows: 1) migratory pres-
sure on urban areas8 that resulted from the industrialization and eco-
nomic growth from the 1950s to the 1990s; 2) uncontrolled urbaniza-
tion that has effectuated the dynamic growth of suburbs and
spontaneous constructions; 3) the anomie of transition period (this is a
situation in which a number of individual actions intersect, or they are
integrated into the social norms; a state in which (old) norms and rules
are destabilized or social and societal norms are absent or nonexistent);
4) the legal framework (e.g., an inadequate system of spatial and urban
planning, insufficient plans or absence of their rigidity, inefficiencies in
urban planning, etc.); 5) deficient housing and urban policy (unsolved
existential housing issues for numerous citizens, a lack of access to
solving the housing needs and affordability of housing); 6) significant
immigration because of armed conflicts and wars over the period from
1991 to 1999 (leading to the massive influx of refugees and internally
6 Van Gelder (2010) indicated that urban informality in developing countries
has been faced with tenure security as developmental propulsion. There are
(footnote continued)
three different forms of tenure security: as perceived by inhabitants, as a legal
act de jure, and de facto, i.e., a tripartite concept: the perception of dwellers, de
jure, and de facto.
7 Considering the characteristics of the institutional framework in Serbia since
the 1990s, new institutionalism offers an explanation of the development of
(non)standard political practices and institutional deviations. Political nomen-
clatures transfer powers onto the political parties and interest groups, leaving
key institutions without any decision-making power.
8 From 1953 to 2011, the share of urban population in the total population of
Serbia increased from 22.5% to 59.4% (Mitrović, 2015).
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displaced persons and their housing needs); 7) the impact of the global
economic and financial crisis on unemployment that led to impover-
ishment of the majority of the population; 8) weak governance and
implementation (unsuccessful control of unplanned construction, cor-
ruption, and monopoly); 9) key contextual factors and possibilities
(e.g., IIC as a tool of social policy, the emergence of an “informal”
economy, limited investments in the supply of urban construction land
and infrastructure, speculative construction, and expectations of lega-
lization).
Yet, the essential cause of IIC in Serbia is perhaps the inefficiency of
the institutional framework in facilitating and meeting affordable
housing needs as well as a non-compliance to legal norms. Informal
construction is tacitly tolerated and/or deliberately marginalized (by
the state) as an outcome that occurs beyond the realm of the the law or
in the absence of law due to the inconsistencies, ambiguities, and
contradictions of the ideological, legal, and institutional systems, i.e.,
normative dissonance (Lazic & Cvejic, 2007).
In Serbia, IIC is also a consequence of failing to meet existential
housing demands due to a combined impact of inconsistent legal,
planning, and institutional frameworks (i.e., legal vacuum) which is a
process of uncontrolled urbanization and migration pressures.9 In this
institutional prolonged uncertainty, IIC has intensified mainly in order
to meet the existential social needs of the less advantaged and middle
class populations with a significant share of “speculative” housing and
other construction in the market (Zeković, Maričić, & Cvetinović,
2016). This has led to confusion in the use of the term IIC, meaning that
illegal and informal construction are not sufficiently differentiated and
that they relate to different forms of construction without building
permits. Mass IIC in Serbia, as a multi-dimensional issue with different
components, is based on the co-existence of the informal and the illegal
as a reflection of their juxtaposition. In the following two sub-sections,
we will examine how IIC developed during the socialist and post-so-
cialist periods.
3.1. Socialist period (1945–1990)
The socialist period of development in Serbia was characterized by
two phases: i) the administrative-centralist system and post-war re-
storation based on a communist paradigm (1945–1950) and ii) a system
of relative self-management (1950–1990) inherently featuring different
phases (with associated labor and consensus economics). The political
system in Yugoslavia after the Second World War was founded on state
ownership with the Communist Party in strong control over the
economy in accordance with the USSR model. Private property was
marginalized; it only remained in the agricultural sector and in housing
(family houses in the rural areas and urban periphery). The state's ta-
keover of the key resources in private and other forms of property was
accomplished together with new urban planning regulations by natio-
nalizing, confiscating, and expropriating real estate.
The economic basis for the socialist self-management political
system was a type of “exotic” social ownership – one might say, “the-
oretically inconsistent”, legally inarticulate, and seldom empirically
and objectively researched. The Law on the Nationalization of Rentals
and Construction Land, Nationalizing Built and Non-Built Construction
Land in Urban Areas and Urban Settlements, was adopted by the
Yugoslav Assembly in 1958. Construction land passed into state own-
ership for which the state took full control. After the adoption of the
Law on Determining Construction Land in Cities and Urban Settlements
in 1968, this land became socially owned. Social ownership is a specific
form of ownership, i.e., the property of construction land belongs to all
of the residents of a particular social community - the state, republic,
province, regions, municipalities, and so forth. This form of ownership
existed between 1968 and 2006. The owners of construction land be-
came its users, and the right of access could not be alienated. Because
construction land could not be marketed, the legal transfer and devel-
opment of the real estate market was ceased.
During the period of relative self-management, a special phase of
associated labor, consensus economics, self-management agreements,
and social arrangements was based on the principles of decentraliza-
tion, “democratization”, and “bottom-up” decision-making.10 Urban
and spatial planning were gradually losing their significance as tools for
regulating social relations in space; plans were not realized due to a
general disrespect for legalities and the arbitration and rigidity in their
passing. In the housing sector, according to the Constitution of the SFRY
(Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974), all employees had the
right to compete for obtaining a socially-owned apartment for use.
However, that right was reduced to less than 50% of employees due to
insufficient finances for residential construction (4–6% was deducted
from all employees' gross earnings as participation for housing con-
struction). Other modalities of solving the housing need (cooperative
residential construction, crediting private construction, subsidizing the
leasing of private apartments, etc.) were not established.
3.1.1. Emergence of IIC
IIC had been a widespread phenomenon in the former Yugoslavia,
and Živković (1981) contended that perhaps the issues mentioned
previously led to citizens once again opting for it. Until 1980, in Serbia,
illegal buildings accounted for one third of all buildings (Milić et al.,
2004), however, to date, there are no reliable data regarding the
number, structure, and type of IIC in Serbia during the 1990s. It was
mainly concentrated in big cities, especially in Belgrade (Table 1).
Petovar (1992) provides data on the dynamics of total and illegal re-
sidential construction with the example of 32 cities in Serbia, including
Belgrade, and he indicates that approximately 20% of the total number
of apartments was illegal. The greatest part of construction occurred
outside the urban area by converting agricultural land into urban plots.
IIC was conditioned by contextual factors, especially in the field of
property rights.11
Sources: Žegarac (1999); 1Primary database of MBTIS (2017).
As the result of a credibility gap between the ideological framework
and housing needs, IIC was intensified within the political system. The
credibility gap is an apparent discrepancy between what is systemically
declared and institutionally established and what occurs in practice
regarding IIC. The aggravation of the availability of housing in the
1990s encouraged the momentum of individual self-building and in-
dividual housing construction. The causes in the socialist period were
different from those in the post-socialist period, and they were pre-
cipitated by the inefficient and unsustainable functioning of formal
institutions.
The socialist period is characterized by several forms of IIC12: a)
9 Some maintain that formal property rights lead to a reduced migration
(Zheng, Gu, & Zhu, 2019), but our study lends no support to this. In fact, as-
certains the reversed situation, as property rights were shaped by the large
influx of migrants.
10 In the socialist system of the former Yugoslavia, citizen participation in the
planning of residential and urban environments was imperative (Vujović et al.,
1971). Citizens were involved in the decision-making at the local level despite
the lack of efficiency, complicated procedures, authoritarian decision-making of
the power centers, etc.
11 The dominance of social ownership over construction land, the construc-
tion of social/collective housing, the marginal extent of legal construction of
individual houses, various restrictions in the construction of privately-owned
apartments, the impossibility of private housing construction for the market,
and no legal transfer of building land.
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construction of private buildings in the suburbs and the invasion of
public construction land and public areas (by establishing kiosks and
structures as well as usurping public land) with silent or “temporary”
permission of the formal institutions; b) construction in the built central
urban area with massive vertical enlargements and the addition of new
floors atop old buildings (so-called “piggy-back buildings”),13 and
construction of buildings on public surfaces of built urban zones
(“densification”); c) construction in protected areas, planned infra-
structural corridors, rural areas; and d) slums and “non-hygienic” set-
tlements.14
3.1.2. Credibility of IIC
Due to a shortage of commercial apartments and construction land,
the impossibility of acquiring socially-owned land for the construction
of individual buildings, and weak management, IIC became a credible
solution for the housing deficit despite its lack of legitimacy. Basically,
the contextual framework and the confronting housing and urban po-
licies had strengthened the parallel processes of co-evolution, co-ex-
istence, self-organization, and self-management despite the socialist
institutional structures. This resulted in an explosion of IIC in the
suburbs and in developed urban areas. Since it was impossible for the
socialist model to meet the housing demand, IIC became an alternative
method for achieving this by means of self-organization (Zeković et al.,
2016) which often led to conflicts.
IIC remained outside the institutional, fiscal, and planning systems.
This created a paradoxical situation in which approximately half of the
buildings were outside the legal system (fiscal, property registry, etc.).
State intervention amounted to a policy of legalizing buildings by
“fitting” them into plans even though it could not prevent the social and
institutional causes of IIC. Although IIC ruined the integrity of legal
construction, it formally became a “credible” social mechanism in the
institutional changes. This implied the necessity to assess its credibility
from the point of its juxtaposition (see: Section 3.2.1 below).
3.2. Post-socialist period (from 1990 onwards)
The break-up of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic of
Serbia introduced a new concept of neoliberal capitalism along with a
radical change in institutions and property rights. The contradictions of
IIC from the socialist period multiplied during the post-socialist period
(i.e., the weakening of the role of planning, increasing market pres-
sures, and rent-seeking), in fact, with the support of the government
and additionally triggered by innumerable refugees15 after the break-up
of Yugoslavia. A new wave of IIC was launched as a spontaneous re-
sponse to the privatization of urban construction land, tenancy rights,
and tenure under conditions of low economic recovery and rampant
corruption. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (2006) laid down
the legal basis for the abolition of social property and the introduction
of private property over the urban construction land.
Simultaneously, with the process of the privatization of state and
socially-owned apartments (1990–1995), Serbia passed a “set of
building laws” in 1995 to create favorable conditions for building and
attracting foreign investors. Interestingly, IIC had the tacit support of
the local and central governments even after the passing of the Law on
Building of Objects in Serbia in 2001, according to which IIC was
considered a criminal act. The crux of this contradictory phenomenon
lies in the state's systemic impossibility of meeting housing demands, a
lack of affordable housing policy, underdeveloped social housing, ex-
plosive progression in real estate, and real estate speculation.
After 2000, the legislation on building land was incorporated in the
spatial-urban planning legislation (Planning and Construction Act/PCA,
2003). There was a radical change in the system of land disposition at
the local level; private property on other types of building land, sale and
transfer of undeveloped land use rights were permitted, and the lease of
state land up to 99 years was introduced instead of the land use right.
This law introduced measures for the legalization of buildings.
From 2004 to 2015, the state realized the Project of Real Estate
Management in Serbia. The aim of the project was improving the effi-
ciency, transparency, availability, and reliability of the real estate
management system in Serbia. The new PCA (2009) regulated the
process of establishing private property on building land. According to
the PCA, building land can have many forms of ownership. It is com-
mercial, and the conversion of building land use rights into property
rights is regulated with or without tax.
By adopting the amendments to the PCA (2014 and 2015), the
controversial provisions on the conversion of access rights to con-
struction land into the right of property were excluded with a fee. The
Land Conversion Law that allows the conversion of land use rights into
property rights on construction land with a fee was passed in 2015. All
construction land in public ownership can be subjected to this con-
version procedure unless it is designated for public use or is a subject of
Table 1









1955. 6928 – 23,599 30,527
1975. 17,903 1062 42,719 61,689
1988. 37,963 3518 88,488 129,969
Post - socialist (From 1990 Onwards)
1995. 33,594 3351 116,423 153,368
2017.1 203,298 – 63,357 266,655
Table 2
Dynamics of population, economic growth, housing and urban land in Belgrade
(1991–2011).
Sources: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2014); http://publikacije.
stat.gov.rs/G2014/Pdf/G20142013.pdf.
Indicators 1991 2002 2011 Index 2011/
1991
1. Population 1,602,226 1,576,124 1,659,440 103.6
2. GDP - total (in billion €) 8.5 5.76 12.78 150.4
3. Total number of
apartments
512,4071 586,8891 702,7751 137.2
4. Urban construction land
(ha)
37,331.82 – 111,260.73 298.0
1 2011 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of
Serbia, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade (2012), http://data.
stat.gov.rs/Home/Result/31020301?languageCode=sr-Cyrl.
2 Corine Land Cover (EEA, 2013) http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-map.






13 In addition to laws, local regulations on the possibility of upgrading
housing buildings during the 1990s supported the spreading of IIC to areas of
the urban center (Lazić, 2005).
14 Milić et al. (2004) distinguished eight forms of illegal construction and
illegal settlements: slums; substandard old settlements; old residential districts
in cities with added/reconstructed housing premises; areas of several dwellings
in one common yard; areas of unplanned construction on state-owned agri-
cultural land (suburban); compact, newly-built illegal settlements (suburban);
illegal construction in protected urban and non-urban areas, and additions to
the existing multi-story residential buildings.
15 The estimated number of refugees and internally displaced persons in
Serbia is between 800,000 and 1,000,000 (Milić et al., 2004).
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a restitution claim. The by-law facilitates the conversion of public land
lease into private ownership free of charge or at a lower than market
price.
There was a paradox during the period 1990–2015 in Serbia: a
dynamic growth of the total number of apartments, especially in ICBs,
in spite of a negative economic growth (from 1991 to 2000, the GDP
was −6.3%). The trend of rapid IIC growth continued from 2000 to
2015 with an average GDP growth from 5.4.% (2000–2008) and a GDP
growth of 0.6% (2008–2015). Simultaneously, the average share of
land development fees and contributions for construction land was re-
duced in the local budgets (Zeković, Vujošević, & Maričić, 2015).
Similar developments were realized in Belgrade but with a higher
level of GDP growth (see Table 2 below). Urban construction land in-
creased three times from 1991 to 2013. The new institutional frame-
work discontinued the financing of socially-owned apartments (in
1990) and “solidarity flats”; the socially-owned housing stock and so-
lidarity housing stock were privatized at a crash price (1990–1996).
The “real-estate bubble” was manifested in the increase of ICBs in
Serbia. The MBTIS prepared the first database of ICBs (2.05 million in
2017) without any specifications of the type of building intervention. In
Serbia, residential and other buildings dominate in the total number of
ICBs (Table 3).
In Belgrade, there were 266,655 ICBs, i.e., 13.0% of all ICBs in
Serbia. Approximately one-half of the residential buildings were illeg-
ally constructed. Because there are no data on the types of building
interventions or on the number of apartments in ICBs, the registered
data can be considered as insufficient for reliable assessment. At the
same time, a significant increase of IIC in Serbia and Belgrade (Table 3)
substantiates the genuine credibility of these arrangements.
In Serbia, there were 583 Roma settlements and 1062 Roma com-
munities (with 123,000 inhabitants) of which 43% were slums
(Fig. 1).16 There were 23,895 substandard buildings inhabited by
56,276 individuals (Đorđević, 2017). In Belgrade, there were 98 Roma
settlements and 207 Roma communes/slums with a total population of
24,000 (GUP Belgrade, 2016). The informal settlements (i.e., IIC) in
Belgrade comprise 5430 ha (22% of building land), occupying 43% of
the surface of residential areas in compact settlements in 34 urban
zones, 18 informal settlements of low density, and in slums. Members of
the least advantaged social classes constructed only 18% of the illegal
buildings which indicates that the builders predominantly belong to the
middle or upper classes (Fig. 2). Due to the phenomenon of IIC pro-
liferation, Belgrade, as a European metropolis, is more similar to cities
of the “Global South”.
3.2.1. Empirical analysis of the tenure security and credibility of IIC
The importance of the three key elements of the credibility of IIC in
Serbia's urban development process in both the socialist and post-so-
cialist periods is preliminarily estimated. In the absence of measurable
data about IIC credibility, we applied an interpretative approach in our
analysis that involves hypothetical relations and “scenery” (mise-en-
scéne) coupling of socially powerful and politically influential actors,
development, and urban path-dependence processes. IIC is a con-
sequential process of historical and socio-economic conditions and not
only of legal, planning, or “institutional error”. The evolutionary path-
Table 3
Structure of illegally constructed buildings in Serbia and Belgrade.
Category of illegally constructed buildings Serbia Structure (in %) Belgrade Structure (in %) Share of Belgrade in Serbia (in %)
Residential 975,822 47.58 203,298 76.2 20.8
Office/business 38,954 1.89 14,513 5.4 37.2
Residential-office 19,346 0.94 17,140 6.4 88.6
Commercial 17,520 0.85 4218 1.6 24.1
Auxiliarya 721,941 35.20 18,057 6.8 2.5
Economic 244,573 11.92 2323 0.9 0.9
Industrial 9491 0.46 4049 1.5 42.7
Infrastructure lines 1392 0.06 0 0 0
Others 21,575 1.05 3057 1.1 14.2
Total 2,050,614 100.0 266,655 100.0 13.0
Source: Primary database of illegally constructed buildings of the MBTIS (2017).
a This refers to the utility and other objects that are linked to the primary building (garages, storage, septic tanks, swimming pools, water tanks, wells, etc.). Also,
we do not have information as to which category slums belong (and if they are even included at all) regarding the available data MBTIS (2017) according to the
purpose of objects.
Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of Roma setllements in Serbia (Vuksanović-Macura,
2012).
16 See https://rm.coe.int/16801e8e4b in Ad hoc Committee of experts on Roma
issues (CAHROM), Thematic report on (re-)housing solutions for Roma and alter-
native measures to (forced) evictions, Strasbourg, 5 October 2014.
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dependence of IIC development as an endogenously generated phe-
nomenon points to the strong ability of IIC to adapt and function. The
larger part of total construction is realized outside of formal channels. It
shows that IIC dominates as an informal concept of urban development
in the post-socialist context. It also shows that a substantial part of the
total investment was directed to IIC in informal economic assets and
business activities of the “grey” economy despite the challenges and
risks of the legal security of property rights. An analysis of IIC in Serbia,
in relation to the three main elements of the credibility thesis suggests
the following:
• Juxtaposition of IIC, the coexistence of two modified IIC forms
(informal and illegal), and the fragmented functionality of all of the
forms in a space-time dimension;
• Mass IIC functions by providing residential needs for those who do
not have access to the formal real estate market or for those who
construct facilities for the market. The role of IIC is essential con-
sidering that it comprises 44% of the housing stock in Serbia;
• Wide diversification of different credibility levels among stake-
holders;
• The attraction and accumulation of credible effects to most players
as the result of endogenous changes;
• High fragmentation and ramification of IIC forms and their di-
versified credibility levels related to relatively high tenure security;
• Highlighted spontaneous development and territorial imbalance of
IIC in Serbia with a domination of the metropolitan areas (Belgrade
and Novi Sad);
• Unexplored positive and negative economic aspects of IIC that
substantially reflect the economic and legal concepts of property
rights.
The analysis of IIC credibility has confirmed that institutional forms
do not converge but, at the same time, IIC persistently co-exists in
various combinations regardless of the development level. It is
estimated that the formal instruments (e.g., private ownership of con-
struction land, lease, and a varieties of property rights) did not have a
more significant contribution to urban development in comparison to
IIC. Additionally, in the post-socialist context, there is often the practice
of alienating or leasing free-of-charge public construction land to stra-
tegic investors, allocating free plots for business purposes in the sub-
urban area (without charging land development fees), marginal in-
vestment in social housing, and minimal investment in infrastructure
and utilities.
The key features of the IIC are as follows: various forms (hetero-
geneous structures in terms of legal, social, technical, and other issues);
different zones of IIC (urban, suburban, rural settlements, protected
areas, industrial zones, infrastructure corridors, etc.); the owners of
ICBs belong to all income groups (low-income to high income); no ac-
cess to finance, credit, and home-insurance; relatively high level of self-
construction; and de facto tenure security of IIC regardless of the level
illegality/legality.
The “zero-point” in the timeline of the evolution of property rights
and land tenure security as essential, important instruments in the
urban growth process can be regarded as having begun with the
adoption of the Law on Nationalization of Rentals and Construction
Land, Nationalizing Built and Non-Built Construction Land in Urban
Areas and Urban Settlements in 1958. The changes in land occupancy,
tenure security, property rights, and the right to convert construction
land into ownership all comprise the third element that makes the
credibility thesis particularly relevant to the issues of informal urban
development in Serbia.
The preliminary assessment of the tenure security and credibility
level of IIC in Serbia is based on the modified typology of informal
building, which was established by Milić et al. (2004), and on the ap-
plied criteria (legal status of land tenure and property, level of infra-
structure standards, and access of social services). The criteria of the
accessibility to finances, credit, and building-insurance are excluded
because of their formal unavailability to all IIC. A preliminary
Fig. 2. Informal areas in Belgrade (black), UN-HABITAT (2006).
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evaluation of the institutional function of IIC through credibility was
provided in Table 4. The empirical analysis has ascertained a high or
relatively high level of de facto tenure security of the majority IIC17
forms (Table 4). Insecure tenure encompasses different cases from il-
legality to some forms of tolerated occupation and occupation legit-
imized by endogenous practices but not accepted as legal.
The relevance of the credibility theory in relationship to the Serbian
experience with IIC is reflected by: a) the confirmation of the postulates
being reallocated from institutional forms to institutional functions; b)
the confirmation of the postulate of its endogenous origin resulting
from spontaneous development due to the inconsistencies of the in-
stitutional framework and the impossibility of meeting the housing
demands in the (post)socialist context as well as due to considerable
deliberate IIC development to satisfy market demand; c) a conflict with
the concept of structural functionalism (i.e., the framework of meeting
the housing needs by massive construction of dwellings in public
ownership) based on an idealized social balance. IIC is the consequence
of a dynamic imbalance in terms of persistent systemic weaknesses in
solving the housing demand proclaimed through the institutional fra-
mework; and d) its applicability in (post)socialism, especially in the
protection of social interests (in terms of the inconsistencies of the in-
stitutional and financial frameworks) and tenure security.
4. State policy against IIC in socialist and post-socialist contexts
The state policy for preventing IIC is different in the socialist and
post-socialist context. The socialist period included many restrictive
measures. The applied measures did not provide any results because
they did not address the causes of IIC but only the consequences. There
are no data on the volume and effectiveness of the intervention mea-
sures. In the empirical analysis, the measures of state policy were
preliminarily interpreted, assessed, and summarized in accordance with
the CSI checklist (Table 5).
Despite the fact that later decisions facilitated the demolition of
buildings, this was not a frequent practice. According to Saveljić
(1988), 26% of the illegal buildings in Belgrade were demolished due to
the Program of Measures and Actions for Curbing Illegal Construction
in the socialist period. The urban planning and housing policies were
extremely restrictive regarding private initiative and the different op-
tions for solving the housing issue outside socially-owned apartment
development.
The silent treatment of IIC by the government due to its incapacity
to prevent it and the impossibility of institutions to function because of
a lack of finances for legalization are evident. Illegal construction was
legalized by numerous urban plans and by a number of programs of
reconstruction and redevelopment. A restrictive urban planning policy
was reflected in strict urban standards and rules. Legalization of IIC
during the greater part of the post-socialist period was stimulated by
relatively credible policies of exemptions and acceptances, without
strategic guidelines or limitations, and with the implementation of
semi-restrictive policies and plans. During the post-socialist period,
there were several unsuccessful attempts at regulating this phenom-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17 In Serbia, there were several types of (land) tenure: freehold (provides a
high degree of security), leasehold (secure), public rental of public land (high
degree of security), and informal tenure systems (varying degrees of legality or
illegality; unauthorized subdivisions on legally owned land); and various forms
of unofficial arrangements. Several forms of tenure may co-exist in IIC or even
on the same plot.
18 E.g., law on special conditions for issuing building permits (1997), the so-
called “Legalization Law”; decision on temporary rules and conditions for is-
suing building permits and use permits for buildings constructed and re-
constructed without a building permit (2003); Law on Property Legalization
(2015); decision on the legalization of illegally and informally constructed
buildings in Belgrade (1993).
S. Zeković, et al. Cities 97 (2020) 102548
9
restrictive approach to legalization (examining the urban and spatial
plans, creating temporary building rules in every municipality, redu-
cing the conditions and documents for obtaining permits, financial
exemptions, and setting local legalization fees) was created. Based on
this law, 3% of the structures were legalized (Milić et al., 2004). The
key reasons are an existing scepticism towards the authorities, unwill-
ingness to accept financial obligations, and others.
During the socialist and post-socialist periods, Serbia applied var-
ious ad hoc interventions against IIC (Table 5) without linking them to
the level of credibility of these arrangements. Although illegal con-
struction is considered a criminal act, legalization of IIC and its ac-
ceptance and formalization dominated. In the practices of the urban
development in Serbia, there was a paradox in the policy of colla-
boration between public utility enterprises and IIC. Regulations from
the 1990s forbade the provision of utility connections to ICBs, thus
discriminating IIC and affording many opportunities for corruption,
manipulation, and illegal connections into the infrastructure.
The primary limitations to the realization of the legalization policy
stem from the complexities of IIC; insufficient institutional support; lack
of housing, utilities and public services policies; insufficiently qualified
institutions and inadequate cooperation between them; and the lack of
finances for improving the utility infrastructure, reconstruction, and
provision of social services. The numerous state interventions were
directed through different institutional patterns, mostly urban plan-
ning, urban land policy, and utility infrastructure. According to the Law
on Property Legalization (2015, 201819), legalization is free of charge,
and there is a lack of human resources in institutions that carry out the
formalization of property.
In the period from 1990 to 2015, six laws on legalization were
passed in Serbia. Their contributions were deficient considering that a
very small percentage of property was legalized. Mojović and Ferenčak
(2011) assessed that the interventions produced insignificant results.
Every law postponed the deadline for legalization. According to the Law
on Special Conditions for Registering Property Rights on Buildings
Constructed without a Building Permit (2013), the registration of
property rights enables legal security in the real estate trade. The Law
on the Legalization of Illegal Buildings (2013), Law on Property Lega-
lization (2015), and the Regulation on the Criteria for Fee Reduction for
Construction Land in the Process of Legalization (2009) prescribe the
payment of fees for development, which is 99% less than the standard
value determined by local decisions (as a benefit for IIC).
This indicates: 1) the limitation of the local authorities because the
central government prescribes the reduction of taxes for building land
for which the local government is in charge; 2) discrimination against
owners who constructed their buildings legally and paid the taxes, and
3) the reduction of the city budgets. The Anti-Corruption Agency of
Serbia (ACAS, 2011) pointed to the possibility of corruption because of
the legalization regulations. Based on the Law on Property Legalization
(2015), only 2.3% of ICBs were legalized (MBTIS, 2017). The policy of
legalizing property in Serbia is based on less expensive solutions along
with insufficient readiness of the institutions to complete the process.
IIC is characterized by widespread tax and fee evasions. Generally, it
can be concluded that the free-of-charge national legalization policy is
unsuccessful and non-credible, and it influences a socially accepted
growth of IIC. Additionally, IIC presents a potential risk for the owners
and the surroundings. Numerous cases of IIC did not respect the tech-
nical standards and building norms which makes these buildings safety
hazards for their users and for the environment (e.g., more than
hundreds of holiday houses are in the I zone of water storage protection
for water supply).
The Law on Property Legalization has allowed the owner, i.e., the
manager of a public good, to carry out legalization in protected natural
goods or to legalize everything that interest groups and influential in-
dividuals decide should be legalized despite the harm to the public
interest and rights of other citizens. In this context, these laws have
become a means of manipulation with non-credible overall effects.
To summarize, what is credible for one part of the actors, at the
same time, causes public damage because those individuals involved in
IIC do not pay a land development fee; do not construct projects of
public interest that are financed from local budgets; do not pay property
tax; and often threaten the achieved standards and quality of life that is
funded by legal builders. Moreover, a high share of IIC in the overall
number of buildings in Serbia (42%) can be an indicator of corruption
and trade of interests at all levels of government. The preliminary as-
sessment of the credibility of IIC for different actors is shown in Table 6.
IIC is credible for the owners of these buildings, i.e., for those who
live in them, and is conditionally credible for the legal builders who
allowed “piggy-back building”. Prohibited turnover of construction
land has contributed to significant revenues for the users of it. IIC is
credible for investors who build without permission or exceed the re-
quirements established in the license as well as for investors who do not
pay land development fees. IIC is not credible for the local revenue
budgets (e.g., absence of IIC taxation and development fees) and for
legal builders who were required to pay all of the taxes and develop-
ment fees. The assessment of the IIC credibility level may appear to be a
counterfactual analysis, but it is only an illustration of the juxtaposition
of IIC with contrasting effects.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
The current system and practice of IIC in Serbia has not been har-
monized with the main trajectory of structural reform and transitional
changes, especially related to the legal status of tenure security and
property rights in the post-socialist period. For Serbian IIC, the juxta-
position and relatively high tenure security are inherent which resulted
in their credibility. IIC can be interpreted as an endogenously created
social response to institutional inefficiency, the inconsistency of the
legal system, the absence of the supply and demand mechanism for
apartments, the lack of urban plans, and restrictive urban policies.
The normative dissonance in the socialist and post-socialist con-
textual frameworks has contributed to the emergence of a new non-
institutional form of construction – mass IIC – in a combination of two
concepts: illegal and informal. It is also a result of inefficient public
institutions, economic conditions, governance and planning deficiency,
and immigration pressure on Serbian cities.
Urban development in Serbia is determined by complex causality,
non-credible policies, imbalance, and relative credibility of IIC as an
inherent systemic and social “product”. IIC, at the same time, has re-
ceived positive feedback as well as negative (e.g., “lock-in”). It has a
spatially visible imbalance resulting from the unsustainable institu-
tional frameworks and the socio-economic patterns, on one side, and
the dynamic endogenous, uncontrolled, and spontaneous social and
individual response on the other.
IIC would not be possible without the active role of the political and
professional actors in the transfer of institutional power according to
their interests such as rent-seeking (read: corruption) and influence
peddling. Due to the “ineffectiveness” of the existing institutions, a lack
of strategic policies, weakness of planning systems, and a lack of urban
plans, IIC has grown to massive proportions. It is concluded that several
modes of legalization policies have been unsuccessful and non-credible;
they have influenced the increase of IIC credibility. It is necessary to
point out that the consolidation of IIC should be endogenously formed
rather than exogenously designed on the institutional credibility ana-
lysis and the combination of appropriate CSI.
19 Due to the significant share of speculation in illegal construction, this law
prescribes the division of responsibilities between investors, plot owners, and
contractors. Illegal construction is considered a criminal act (against life,
health, personal safety, property, security of infrastructure and settlements, and
the environment) because of the involved money laundering, fiscal evasion,
trading of influence, and bribery (Law on Criminal Procedure, 2014).
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Recommendations for the improvement of the institutional cred-
ibility of IIC include: 1) developing and implementing an effective
housing policy and affordable housing model; 2) the rehabilitation of
illegal construction (one of the six national urban development pro-
grams, defined by the Strategy of Sustainable and Integrated Urban
Development of Serbia until 2030 (2019)), which would directly influ-
ence the causes of illegal and informal construction of residential
housing; 3) the stimulation of positive and the discouragement of the
negative effects of IIC to overcome “lock-in”; 4) better approaches to
social services and technical infrastructure; 5) sustainable improvement
of finance in addressing the challenges of IIC (necessary resources are
high which is the main reason for the delay in the process of completing
social and technical services); 6) principles of social justice for all and
the protection of property rights and civil rights, especially for the
weaker and less capable; 7) an analysis of the main stakeholders' po-
sitions in the implementation of the CSI; 8) coordination of planning,
urban land policy, and city governance (e.g., matching the mid-term
programs of building land, public utility enterprises, and infrastructural
projects with the mid-term local budget projections); and 9) prevention
of IIC, which implies the definition of social and political “agendas”,
better strategic policies, and the innovation of the institutional frame-
work. It is clear that the acceptance of the positive and negative ex-
periences of IIC arise from its juxtaposition.
It is also concluded that the IIC in Serbia cannot and perhaps also
should not be totally prevented. It is estimated that it will be difficult to
change the status of IIC because of the resistance of various institutional
actors and due to corruption. IIC has numerous benefits for the influ-
ential interest groups that are most frequently its generators and dri-
vers. We suggest the study of the equalization of attributes of laws (law
and non-law), i.e., parallel functioning of IIC until the establishment of a
unified system can occur. Therefore, it appears to be probable that IIC
would remain a parallel and autonomous form of urban development in
Serbia.
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